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Abstract
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, cardiothoracic surgery is arguably the most successful
of all medical specialties. There are effective treatments including transplantation, for almost all
cardiac and thoracic diseases that can be performed with low morbidity and mortality.
Cardiothoracic surgeons have mastered technical difficulties through innovation, hard work,
planning and skill. Yet in the past decade, the primacy of cardiothoracic surgery has been challenged
by new technologies. This paper applies business school theories to examine how cardiothoracic
surgeons might best respond to such "disruptive technologies". Otherwise well-managed business
and industrial enterprises have had difficulty dealing with disruptive technological change because
of well-recognized organizational impediments. Cardiothoracic surgeons must understand the
characteristics of disruptive technologies and consider organizational changes that will allow the
profession to better adapt to them.
Background
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, cardi-
othoracic surgeons have prided themselves as being
among the most talented and sophisticated of all of their
surgical colleagues. They not only mastered the field of
general surgery, but they have had very long, difficult
training, and they have charted new areas of research and
technical expertise. Perhaps most importantly, they have
performed extremely dangerous and sophisticated opera-
tions, with good results that have kept improving. If the
specialty of cardiothoracic surgery were a unified organi-
zation, it would be considered well managed. As a disci-
pline, cardiothoracic surgery has met the technical
difficulties encountered through innovation, hard work,
planning, and skill. Notwithstanding this record of per-
formance, during the past decade cardiothoracic surgery
has been challenged and many of its most successful pro-
cedures now are at risk of becoming obsolete by less ele-
gant procedures with less certain outcomes performed by
specialists with less training. This paper examines whether
the specialty of cardiothoracic surgery is at risk of failing.
It will use industrial models originally developed to
explore the difficulties well managed companies faced
when confronting new technologies. It is the premise of
these models that there are two types of technologies: (1)
sustaining technology, which is successfully mastered by
established industries and (2) disruptive technology,
which is problematic and poses a great challenge to estab-
lished organizations.
Cardiothoracic surgery has evolved logically from its
beginnings in general surgery to the surgery of pulmonary
tuberculosis, then to lung cancer surgery and presently to
open-heart surgery. As cardiothoracic surgery has become
more technologically driven by cardiopulmonary bypass
procedures and specifically coronary artery bypass graft
Published: 8 August 2007
Journal of Cardiothoracic Surgery 2007, 2:35 doi:10.1186/1749-8090-2-35
Received: 2 April 2007
Accepted: 8 August 2007
This article is available from: http://www.cardiothoracicsurgery.org/content/2/1/35
© 2007 Cohen; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Journal of Cardiothoracic Surgery 2007, 2:35 http://www.cardiothoracicsurgery.org/content/2/1/35
Page 2 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
surgery, it has demonstrated the characteristic changes of
many established and successful enterprises as they have
faced continuing technological changes. To understand
what is happening to the profession of cardiothoracic sur-
gery, it is necessary to examine how other disciplines have
dealt and continue to deal with technological innovation
and to develop analogies between the practice of cardiot-
horacic surgery and these different organizations. In par-
ticular, while coronary artery bypass graft surgery has
successfully incorporated advances due to improvements
in sustaining technology, it has also faced the threat of
radical or disruptive technological change such as that
posed by angioplasty and coronary artery stenting.
Abernathy-Utterbach Model
James Utterback in his book Mastering the Dynamics of
Innovation states that "innovation is at once the creator
and destroyer of industries and corporations" [1]. Techno-
logical change is both a creative force in the growth of cor-
porations and a destructive force making those same
corporations vulnerable to competitors. "Today when
competitiveness hinges on the ability to develop or adapt
new technologies in products, services, and processes,
understanding the dynamics of industrial innovation and
change is essential for survival and success" [1]. This is as
true for cardiothoracic surgery as it is for industry. Utter-
back and his colleague William Abernathy have devel-
oped a model describing the dynamics of innovation in
industry which they validated using many industrial
examples. The model can easily be applied to the develop-
ment of cardiothoracic surgery.
Their model describes three phases of product and process
innovation that form a general pattern. The first, known as
the "fluid phase" occurs during an industry's or product's
formative years. There is a great deal of experimentation
with product design and operational characteristics by
numerous competitors. An example which Utterback cites
is the early period of the automobile industry when there
was a bewildering array of car models and engines includ-
ing 3 wheel cars, 4 wheel cars, motorized buggies, as well
as steam, electric and finally gasoline propulsion. "During
this fluid period of high product innovation, much less
attention is given to the processes by which products are
made, so the rate of process innovation is significantly less
rapid" [2]. In cardiac surgery, this phase is easily identified
as the early period when cross circulation techniques were
being tried, cardiopulmonary bypass was invented, new
vascular graft prostheses and valve prostheses were rapidly
fielded and a wide variety of new operations for all man-
ner of congenital and acquired cardiac defects were pre-
sented monthly in the journals.
This fluid period gives way to a "transitional phase" in
which innovations in the basic product slow down and
the focus shifts toward innovations in the process of mak-
ing the product or performing the service. Variety in the
product tends to give way to standard designs that have
either proven themselves in the marketplace as the best
form for satisfying user needs, or designs that have been
dictated by accepted standards, by legal or by regulatory
constraints. In the automobile industry, the dominant
design that emerged was the steel frame automobile fully
enclosed as a sedan or coupe, as first introduced by
Dodge. Even today's automobiles are recognizable
descendents of this dominant design. In coronary artery
surgery, the operation performed on cardiopulmonary
bypass using cardiac arrest with cold cardioplegia and any
variety of conduits has emerged as the dominant design
for over 3 decades. Professional standards and training,
industry innovation, patient expectation, and the regula-
tions of the Food and Drug Administration all contrib-
uted to this process, much as similar forces impacted the
automobile industry.
A final phase which Abernathy and Utterback call the
"specific phase" occurs when the rate of major innova-
tion dwindles for both product development and for
manufacturing process development. Not all industries
enter this phase, but those that do become "extremely
focused on cost, volume, and capacity. Product and proc-
ess innovation appears in small, incremental steps" [2].
Organizational arrangements become important. Effi-
ciency and effectiveness become the basis for competi-
tion. Some might think that cardiac surgery entered this
phase with the advent of the managed care era with its
emphasis predominately on price and efficiency, while
others will feel that it is still in the midst of the transition
phase.
Utterback also describes technological "discontinuities",
which are disruptive technologies that reshuffle the deck
of corporate and industrial leadership. The key observa-
tion that Utterback draws from his study is "the extent to
which industries experience waves of change and innova-
tion interspersed with periods of stability and consolida-
tion. When a wave of radical innovation sweeps across an
industry, by definition it renders one or more existing
technologies obsolete, and the firms with products and
internal capabilities bound up by those existing technolo-
gies must either get aboard the new one or expect to be
swept away or relegated to some new role in the industry"
[3]. As the specialty of cardiothoracic surgery has increas-
ingly shifted from an anatomical, organ system basis to a
specialty dominated by the performance of specific high
volume procedures, it too has become subject to these
same types of technological forces.
It is important to be aware of the several themes that
Utterback recognizes. Some of these will also prove rele-Journal of Cardiothoracic Surgery 2007, 2:35 http://www.cardiothoracicsurgery.org/content/2/1/35
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vant in the case of cardiothoracic surgery, but even more
specifically, cardiac surgery. First, "established firms must
occasionally attempt to renew and diversify their core
businesses rather than simply improve and expand their
well-established products. External pressures often stimu-
late a drive for renewal" [4]. Second, once a dominant
design emerges it has the effect of enforcing or encourag-
ing standardization so that production economies and/or
other complementary economies can be sought. Compe-
tition then tends to focus on cost and scale as well as on
product performance. The dominant design can have a
profound impact on the direction and rate of further tech-
nical advance and on the structure of competition. Third,
there are linkages between product technologies, manu-
facturing process, corporate organization and strategy,
and the relationships between manufacturers, distributors
and customers. Finally the period of technological turbu-
lence caused by an invading (discontinuous, disruptive)
innovation is a challenge that calls for a "bold response by
established firms. More often than not the boldness
comes from upstart firms with no standing in the industry
in change. ... Established, dominant firms are more
attracted to incremental (sustaining) innovations than to
radical innovations" [5].
Organizational Change as a Response to Innovation
Michael Porter in The Competitive Advantage of Nations,
notes that innovators are frequently outsiders to the exist-
ing industry. Where innovators are large firms, they are
often new entrants to the industry from an established
position in another industry [6]. Failing firms are often
remarkably creative in defending their entrenched tech-
nologies, which sometimes reach unimagined heights of
elegance in design and technical performance only when
their demise is clearly predictable. A poignant medical
example of this may be the technical elegance of many of
the off pump coronary artery bypass techniques as a
response to angioplasty and stent procedures for coronary
artery occlusions. A large and powerful firm can often
respond with great creativity in defense of its own prod-
ucts, while rarely exhibiting the creativity required to
embrace new discontinuous or disruptive technologies
that would require it to abandon the old concepts. Utter-
back notes that this is "primarily the result of the habits of
mind, commitments and strategy, or patterns of behavior
of the organization's elite" [7].
An even clearer understanding of this process emerges
from the work of Clayton Christensen. His is a landmark
study entitled The Innovator's Dilemma in which he dem-
onstrated why many well managed companies fail [8]. He
has developed insights to help prevent future organiza-
tions from falling into the same trap. Clearly cardiotho-
racic surgery in its purest form is a profession and not a
business enterprise, and many surgeons would be
offended at the analogy; however, there are lessons dis-
covered by Christensen that apply to cardiothoracic sur-
gery as well.
Sustaining and Disruptive Technologies
It is Christensen who has described two main types of
technological innovation which confront established
business enterprises: "sustaining technology" with which
these enterprises deal reasonably successfully, and what
he calls "disruptive technology", which established
organizations often fail to incorporate and manage. Sus-
taining technologies are those that foster improved prod-
uct performance. In contrast, disruptive technologies are
often very different from the mainstream technology
rather than being an incremental improvement. Disrup-
tive technologies usually will under-perform established
products in mainstream markets at least when they are
first introduced, but they have other features that a few
new customers value. Cardiothoracic surgery as a disci-
pline, like many businesses, has been quite successful over
the past four decades in developing, harnessing, and
incorporating sustaining technologies which include car-
diopulmonary bypass, as well as new techniques, treat-
ments, and methodologies which enhance the ability to
do coronary artery bypass surgery. It is having difficulty,
however, adapting to the newer more radical technologies
in the field of cardiac care such as angioplasty, stents, and
catheter based arrhythmia treatments, etc. Some of Chris-
tensen's business analogies clarify the reasons for these
difficulties and make the responses to these disruptive
technologies more predictable.
Christensen studied a list of leading companies in a vari-
ety of fields. Each of the examples he cited went on to fail
when confronted with disruptive changes in technology
and market structure. He uses examples from retail mar-
keting, heavy equipment manufacturing, computers, and
the steel industry to show that the principles he espouses
are broadly applicable. One theme common to the busi-
ness failures he studied was that "the decisions that led to
failure were made when the leaders in question were
widely regarded as among the best companies in the
world. ... There is something about the way decisions get
made in successful organizations that sows the seeds of
eventual failure"[9].
Christensen finds that there is a strategically important
distinction between sustaining technologies and those
that are disruptive. "What all sustaining technologies have
in common is that they improve the performance of estab-
lished products along the dimensions of performance that
mainstream customers in major markets have historically
valued. ... Rarely have even the most radically difficult sus-
taining technologies precipitated the failure of leading
firms" [10]. Cardiac surgery has a long successful trackJournal of Cardiothoracic Surgery 2007, 2:35 http://www.cardiothoracicsurgery.org/content/2/1/35
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record for developing and successfully incorporating sus-
taining technologies into the practice, whether it is new
techniques of bypass or cardioplegia, new operative tech-
niques or new prosthetic devices. The complexity of car-
diac surgery is astounding. Cardiothoracic surgeons have
been able to progressively improve cardiac operations
while decreasing the time to perform them and decreasing
patient mortality and morbidity.
Christensen observes that disruptive technologies occa-
sionally emerge: "innovations that result in worse product
performance, at least in the near term." Ironically in the
cases he studied it was disruptive technology that precipi-
tated leading firms' failures. "Disruptive technologies
bring to a market a very different value proposition than
had been available previously. Generally, disruptive tech-
nologies underperform established products in main-
stream markets, but they have other features that a few
fringe (and generally new) customers value. Products
based on disruptive technologies are typically cheaper,
simpler, smaller, and frequently, more convenient to use"
[11]. The most obvious disruptive technology, which car-
diac surgeons face, is balloon angioplasty of coronary
arteries. In its initial incarnation, angioplasty was fairly
limited to proximal single vessel disease and resulted in a
high rate of restenosis. Sometimes angioplasty failed dra-
matically, resulting in the need for emergency coronary
artery bypass surgery. The procedure was developed by
outsiders, in this case cardiologists and radiologists, who
traditionally were not involved in therapeutic surgical
type interventions, but whose practices had been previ-
ously confined to diagnosis and medical management.
Angioplasty found a niche market because it avoided
unpleasant surgery. Initially it was not viewed as much of
a threat by the cardiac surgery establishment. Some even
thought it might increase the volume of traditional car-
diac surgery performed, which early-on proved to be the
case.
Christensen's second observation may seem a bit more
abstract to the non-business reader. It is that technologies
sometimes can progress faster than market demand. In the
effort to provide better products than their competitors
and earn higher prices and margins, suppliers often "over-
shoot" their market [12]. Examples are the watch, or the
camera or indeed the pacemaker, which has so many
"bells and whistles" that consumers never use, never learn
about, and never care about, so they use the product only
in its simplest most rudimentary mode. A simpler,
cheaper, less elegant alternative may be able to supply
some of the market need. In a similar fashion, the disrup-
tive technology improves over time, even if it never
becomes as sophisticated as the mainstream technology.
This allows disruptive technologies, which underperform
today relative to what users in the market require, to
become fully performance competitive in that same mar-
ket tomorrow. To continue with a cardiac example, angi-
oplasty even with the newest stent technology will
probably never be as elegant, as long lasting or as safe as
coronary artery bypass grafting with a mammary artery.
Angioplasty, however, has become successful enough and
safe enough to satisfy a large portion of the "market".
Christensen's final set of observations is that established
companies using good management practices make their
decisions using financial decision making tools. They
almost always conclude that investing aggressively in dis-
ruptive technologies is not a rational financial decision for
them to make. There are three reasons for this. "First,
[because] disruptive products are simpler and cheaper,
they generally promise lower margins, not greater profits.
Second, disruptive technologies typically are first com-
mercialized in emerging or insignificant markets. And
third, leading firms' most profitable customers generally
don't want, and indeed initially can't use, products based
on disruptive technologies. By and large, the least profita-
ble customers in a market initially embrace a disruptive
technology. Hence, most companies with a practiced dis-
cipline of listening to their best customers and identifying
new products that promise greater profitability and
growth are rarely able to build a case for investing in dis-
ruptive technologies until it is too late"[13]. It is not
immediately clear how this last set of observations directly
relates to a medical field. It seems too closely aligned to
business, profit margins, and effective management. What
Christensen is saying which does apply, is that using
good, sound management and decision making tools as a
screen has frequently not allowed managers to recognize
the importance of new radical technologies. These tools
effectively screen disruptive technologies from considera-
tion. Since there is something called a "first mover"
advantage, the young aggressive upstart company (or
medical specialty), which early on embraces the new tech-
nology, frequently ends up being the leader in the new
field and displaces the older, more established firm. This
is a scenario in pharmaceutical and medical technology
firms that is fairly common.
Organizational Forces
Christensen feels that every company in every industry
works under "certain forces – laws of organizational
nature – that act powerfully to define what that company
can and cannot do. Managers faced with disruptive tech-
nologies fail their companies when these forces over-
power them" [14]. Similarly, the professional forces faced
by cardiothoracic surgeons impact on their ability to deal
with disruptive technology and to come up with alterna-
tive organizational structures in order to deal with them.Journal of Cardiothoracic Surgery 2007, 2:35 http://www.cardiothoracicsurgery.org/content/2/1/35
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Companies depend on customers and investors for
resources. Established firms "stayed atop wave after wave
of sustaining technologies (technologies which their cus-
tomers needed), while consistently stumbling over sim-
pler disruptive ones." The theory of resource dependence
states that "managers may think they control the flow of
resources in their firms, but in the end it is really the cus-
tomers and investors who dictate how money will be
spent because companies with investment patterns that
don't satisfy their customers and investors don't survive."
Well-managed companies have developed systems for
killing ideas that their customers don't want. They find it
difficult to invest in disruptive technologies – lower mar-
gin opportunities that their mainstream customers don't
want – until these customers recognize a use for them, and
by then it is too late [15]. Cardiothoracic surgeons are
appropriately conservative and have been content with
their effective procedures. It has been difficult for them to
devote time, training and research resources into such
non-traditional and disruptive technologies as angi-
oplasty, percutaneous vascular grafts, radio-frequency
arrhythmia ablation and probably many other technolo-
gies until outsiders have established them and cardiotho-
racic surgeons have lost the "first mover advantage".
Small markets don't solve the growth needs of large com-
panies. "Disruptive technologies typically enable new
small markets to emerge. ... Companies entering these
emerging markets early have significant first-mover
advantages over later entrants. And yet as these companies
succeed and grow larger it becomes progressively more
difficult for them to enter the even newer small markets
destined to become the large ones of the future" [16].
There is a mathematical reason for this. Investors expect a
certain percentage return on their investment. A small
company can invest in a small market and a relatively
small profit will satisfy this percentage. The small returns
from a new market would not satisfy the growth require-
ments for a large company. Stated simply, "while a $40
million company needs to find just $8 million in revenues
to grow at 20 percent in the subsequent year, a $4 billion
company needs to find $800 million in new sales. No new
markets are that large. ... The larger and more successful an
organization becomes, the weaker the argument that
emerging markets can remain useful engines for
growth"[17].
In an analogous way, cardiothoracic surgery was founded
as a broad, anatomically based surgical specialty. Cardiot-
horacic surgeons, however, increasingly concentrated on a
few high volume, high intensity, high cost procedures
with excellent financial return. Even when they were inno-
vative leaders in new disruptive technologies such as
fiberoptic bronchoscopy, cardiac pacemakers, and inser-
tion of intra-aortic balloon pumps, they were content to
relinquish leadership roles in these areas to others. It
made good business sense to concentrate on those proce-
dures that yielded a higher marginal return on their
investment of time and energy. They were too large an
enterprise to fool with these "small markets" and so they
yielded the "first mover advantage" to other newer players
such as pulmonologists, intensivists, anesthesiologists
and cardiologists. This is the same type of rationale
employed by the managers of large currently successful
companies, even when their own research and develop-
ment personnel may be well aware of and even have
helped to develop some of these new technologies. The
evidence is strong that formal and informal resource allo-
cation processes make it very difficult for large organiza-
tions to focus adequate energy and talent on small
markets, even when logic says they may be big markets
someday.
Christensen's next principle is that markets that don't exist
can't be analyzed [18]. Sound market research and good
planning followed by execution according to that scheme
are the hallmarks of good business management. Disrup-
tive technologies, by definition are new and immature. It
is impossible to analyze where they will lead or to know
their ultimate impact. Yet it is in disruptive technologies
where there is such an important first mover advantage.
Companies whose investment processes demand quanti-
fication of market sizes and financial returns before they
can enter a market get paralyzed or make serious mistakes
when faced with disruptive technologies. Here is where
medicine has a great advantage over business. Its tradi-
tions emphasize the value of basic research, the kind that
has no goal but scientific knowledge, which may or may
not lead to a technological or medical breakthrough. Phy-
sicians, through their foundations and institutions, sup-
port this type of research, which has resulted in
tremendous societal benefit. Even here there is a danger,
as research resources tighten. Some grant processes award
money to researchers for work already done, and support
"established labs" at the expense of researchers with new
"thinking out of the box" concepts. It is extremely impor-
tant to avoid the pitfall of having research and technolog-
ical efforts over-managed.
Organizational Paradigms and Performance
This leads into the next principle, which is that an organ-
ization's capabilities also define its disabilities. Organiza-
tions have capabilities that exist independent of the
people who work within them. These include their proc-
esses and their values. In business it is these processes and
values that cause employees to prioritize projects to
develop "high-margin products" and to reject projects that
develop "low-margin products" [19]. In cardiac surgery,
processes and values may lead to rejection of technologies
viewed as "too medical" in favor of more traditional sur-Journal of Cardiothoracic Surgery 2007, 2:35 http://www.cardiothoracicsurgery.org/content/2/1/35
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gical approaches involving cutting and sewing". An exam-
ple might be the general surgeons nearly missing the boat
on laparoscopic surgery. They were very slow in embrac-
ing it, possibly because it was viewed as primarily in the
realm of the gynecologist or because it was viewed as too
diagnostic a procedure for their tastes. The transcripts of
many conferences and journals record pronouncements
by distinguished academic surgeons stating that laparo-
scopic surgery was a fad, would never catch on, and had
no place in modern surgical practice. Fortunately, this
technological advance was championed by general sur-
geons in private practice and entered the mainstream in
essence through the back door.
The final principle, which has already been alluded to, is
that technology supply may not equal market demand.
Although disruptive technologies initially can only be
used in small markets remote from the mainstream, as
they improve and catch on, they may become fully per-
formance-competitive within the mainstream market
against established products. This is because the pace of
technological progress in products frequently exceeds the
rate of performance improvement demanded by main-
stream customers. The disruptive technology overtakes
the performance demands of the mainstream market [20].
Christensen's thesis in a nutshell is that well-managed
companies sometimes fail because "the very management
practices that have allowed them to become industry lead-
ers also make it extremely difficult for them to develop the
disruptive technologies that ultimately steal away their
markets." It is clear that failure to deal with disruptive
technology stems from organizational failures and not
from the lack of access or understanding of the technology
itself. The organization's structure and practices prevent it
from recognizing and investing in the disruptive technol-
ogy until it is too late to compete successfully. Likewise,
the profession of cardiothoracic surgery with its training
programs, boards, organizations, sub specialization, and
recertification has developed institutional blocks to the
incorporation of disruptive technologies such as angi-
oplasty, much as the industries outlined by Utterback and
Christensen mastered sustaining technology but have
failed to incorporate disruptive technologies.
Technological Innovation and Cardiothoracic Surgical 
Practice
Thoracic surgery historically was an outgrowth of surgery,
now known as general surgery. It was anatomically and
physiologically based on the organs of the thorax. It was a
broad based discipline that identified diagnostic and ther-
apeutic modalities, mastered new procedures and success-
fully incorporated many sustaining technologies.
Treatment of cardiac disease, (and similar arguments can
be made for pulmonary disease), evolved along two sepa-
rate parental lines from internal medicine to cardiology
and from general surgery to thoracic surgery to cardiac sur-
gery. This made sense when there was a distinction
between "cerebral" diagnostic efforts and procedure ori-
ented therapy. But this distinction has long vanished, as
diagnoses now require interventions, and surgery can be
performed not only with a knife but also less traumati-
cally with a catheter or laser. Simultaneously, cardiac sur-
geons have been abandoning their broad based discipline
to concentrate on the "dominant design" of procedures
based on cardiopulmonary bypass, and specifically on
coronary artery bypass grafting. Cardiothoracic surgeons
have mastered the dominant design and in fact create
more and more elegant sustaining technological refine-
ments even as the market for their "product" evaporates.
In the final analysis, the specialty has matured to the point
that all cardiac diseases can be corrected, even if it requires
transplantation therapy.
To deal with current and future disruptive technologies
and, more importantly, to ensure a robust future which is
not dependent on specific procedures will require major
organizational change. There are two possibilities. The
first is for cardiothoracic surgeons to revisit their historical
roots as thoracic surgeons who were first general surgeons.
The profession of cardiothoracic surgery can re-emphasize
broad based learning in general surgery, vascular surgery,
pulmonary surgery and cardiac surgery. This has a certain
appeal since it was the way that many cardiothoracic sur-
geons were trained. However, this goes against prevailing
trends among thoracic surgery educators to de-emphasize
general surgery training, shorten residencies, and even in
some circles to separate cardiac and general thoracic surgi-
cal training. The advantage of this more general approach
is that it allows cardiothoracic surgeons to move into
other fields and to be flexible as specific procedures and
technologies go through their life cycle of popularity and
obsolescence. It fails to deal, however, with the organiza-
tional complications caused by other surgical specialists
staking claim to various parts of the surgical turf and
defending it vigorously.
A second approach, which may be better, is to completely
reorganize the care of patients with cardiac disease and
similarly patients with pulmonary disease. The distinction
between cardiologist and cardiac surgeon based on the
historical difference between internal medicine and sur-
gery is now largely obsolete. Rather than start as a surgical
or medical resident, it may be better that cardiac practi-
tioners start as such and train in a broad based environ-
ment which incorporates all aspects of cardiac disease
including diagnosis, interventional radiology, interven-
tional cardiology, electrophysiology and cardiac surgery.
In six or seven years, residents could be fully functional in
all aspects of cardiac care, although admittedly theyJournal of Cardiothoracic Surgery 2007, 2:35 http://www.cardiothoracicsurgery.org/content/2/1/35
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would probably want to subspecialize. These new practi-
tioners would no longer fear obsolescence. They would
control their own destiny. No matter what treatments and
procedures come and go, if it involved the heart this spe-
cialty would be the operative force. A similar specialty
could be set up for pulmonary medicine. This type of
training would develop the consummate practitioner,
involved in all aspects of the patient's care.
There is a precedent for such an approach. The most suc-
cessful surgical specialties today are those that are based
on organ systems, which have no medical counterpart,
such as orthopedics, ophthalmology, otolaryngology, and
to a lesser extent urology. They have continued to manage
the diagnosis, medical treatment and surgical treatment in
their respective areas. There are subspecialists within these
areas but their broad based training makes it easier, for
example, for a surgeon to move from the practice of one
orthopedic subspecialty to another as technology changes
than to move say from cardiac surgery to cardiology. A
new specialty encompassing all aspects of both cardiac
surgery and cardiology would control the flow of its
patients and its patient's management regardless of
whether the treatment is "medical", "surgical", chemo-
therapeutic, etc. Practitioners of this new specialty need
not fear either evolutionary or revolutionary change in
their field because they would be organized in a way that
allows adaptation to any technological change. They
would be free to do what is right for their patients without
concern about how technology might modify their prac-
tice, their referrals or their livelihoods.
The difficulty with this type of a solution would be the
transitional period. Current practitioners of both cardiac
surgery and cardiology would have to be at least partially
re-trained. Such a solution would represent a major
organizational challenge requiring the remaking and/or
consolidating of boards, training programs, professional
organizations and, most difficult, the paradigms in which
surgeons and cardiologists think of themselves. It would
require changes in reimbursement rules and involve the
role of government, particularly Medicare. It would be
possible, though difficult.
Other specialties have remade themselves, usually
through the determined efforts and clout of their specialty
boards. One example is the post tonsillectomy era during
which otolaryngology nearly disappeared but reemerged
as a dynamic specialty incorporating head and neck can-
cer surgery, oncology, audiology, otology, some aspects of
medicine, and even plastic surgery. Another example is
anesthesiology, which under the assault of "nurse
anesthesia" has reemerged as a more dynamic specialty
incorporating anesthesia/critical care and pain manage-
ment. A final example is radiology, which has evolved
from a purely diagnostic technologically based field into
almost a surgical subspecialty emphasizing interventional
procedures.
Rosalind Williams concludes, in her book Retooling, a
Historian Confronts Technological Change, that "techno-
logical change forces a series of decisions about money
and control. People and institutions adapt, but adapta-
tion is neither automatic nor straightforward. ... The ide-
ology of technological change implies that market forces
have replaced historical forces. This is not so and will
never be so. Historical change is not planned, nor is it
avoidable. What drives it is more primal than teams or
technology. Historical change happens when people's
deepest feelings get involved, when they are confronted by
a crisis, when they have to question their habits and
assumptions – even cherished ones, because sometimes
habits and assumptions are no longer sustainable no mat-
ter how much they are cherished. This kind of change calls
upon human beings to assume responsibility and to act
courageously" [21].
Conclusion
Our history, traditions, and organizations may prevent
radical change in the field of cardiothoracic surgery. We
need to stand cautioned by the many industrial examples
cited in the papers by Utterback and Christenson that sug-
gest that those who cannot adapt will disappear, but the
changes will nonetheless happen. It is better for us to be
open-minded and flexible in our organizational structures
so that we will control our own professional destiny.
Based on the business models outlined here, it is my
premise that cardiothoracic surgery is at the crossroads
between sustaining and disruptive technological innova-
tions. As a discipline, cardiothoracic surgery must now
choose between adaptation and controllable change as
opposed to stagnation and obsolescence.
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